Brigham Young University Law School

BYU Law Digital Commons
Utah Supreme Court Briefs

1991

Gudmundsen v. : Brief of Respondent
Utah Supreme Court

Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/byu_sc1
Part of the Law Commons
Original Brief Submitted to the Utah Supreme Court; digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law
Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, Brigham Young University, Provo, Utah; machine-generated
OCR, may contain errors.
Pete N. Vlahos; attorney for appellant.
P. Keith Nelson; attorney for repsondent.
Recommended Citation
Brief of Respondent, Gudmundsen v., No. 914580.00 (Utah Supreme Court, 1991).
https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/byu_sc1/3852

This Brief of Respondent is brought to you for free and open access by BYU Law Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Utah Supreme
Court Briefs by an authorized administrator of BYU Law Digital Commons. Policies regarding these Utah briefs are available at
http://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/utah_court_briefs/policies.html. Please contact the Repository Manager at hunterlawlibrary@byu.edu with
questions or feedback.

WW

UtAM $ M W * M E OOURT

oocimem

BRICF

4ft.«

RFv
LAW L

«X;KET NO.

1 ,

J. Reel

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF T]FE
STATE OF UTAH

IN RE:

|
)

SERGE B. GUDMUNDSEN,

)

No. 14580

)

D i s c i p l i n a r y Prodeeding, )
BRIEF OF RESPONDENT
Appeal from the Judgment and Finding* of the
Board of Commissioners of the Utah State Ear
KEITH NB LSON, ESQ.
16 Newhous e Office Building
Salt Lake G ity, Utah
84111

t t o r n e y for Respondent
PETE N. VLAHOS, ESQ.
Legal Forum Building
2447 Xiesel Avenue
Ogden, Utah
8 4401
Attcrnsy for Appellant

FILED
JUL 2 0 1976
N |cierk» Supreme Court, Utah

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF TIJIE
STATE OF UTAH

IN RE:

;

SERGE B. GUDMUNDSEN,

]1

Np. 14580

Disciplinary Prodeeding. ]
- - _ _ _ „ _ _

BRIEF OF RESPONDENT
Appeal from the Judgment and Findings of the
Board of Commissioners of the Utafr. State Bar
P. KEITH NELSON, ESQ.
716 Newhouse Office Building
Salt Lake City, Utah
84111
Attorney for Respondent
PETE N. VLAHOS, ESQ.
Legal Forum Building
2447 Kiesel Avenue
Ogden, Utah
84401
Attorney for Appellant

TABLE OF CONTENTS
STATEMENT OF THE KIND OF CASE. . . . ,

1

FINDINGS OF FACT AND RECOMMENDATIONS ,
FOR DISCIPLINE

1

RULING SOUGHT BY RESPONDENT ON APPEAL

3

STATEMENT OF THE FACTS

3

ARGUMENT
POINT I

7

POINT II

10

CONCLUSION

14

i

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES
UTAH STATUTE
Utah Code Annotated 78-51-41

ii

12

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF TtiE
STATE OF UTAH

IN RE:
SERGE B. GUDMUNDSEN,

No- 14580

Disciplinary Proceeding.
BRIEF OF RESPONDENT

STATEMENT OF THE KIND OF CASE
This is a disciplinary proceeding against the appellant, Serge B. Gudmundsen, brought by the Board of Commissioners
of the Utah State Bar.
FINDINGS OF FACT AND RECOMMENDATIONS
FOR DISCIPLINE
The Board of Commissioners of the Utah State Bar,
following a hearing before Commissioner James B. Lee, found
the actions of the appellant in his handling of two matters
complained of by Verus N. Thornley to be in violation of the
Code of Professional Responsibility and Cannons of Judicial
Ethics of the American Bar Association in the following particulars:

DR2-110 (B) (3) in failing to withdraw from one

case after his physical condition had made it unreasonably
difficult for him to carry out his professional responsibilities; DR2-110 (B) (4) for refusing to withdraw from one case

after he had been discharged by the client, Verus N. Thornely;
and DR9-102 (b) (4) for failing to deliver to the client funds
in his possession which had been advanced by the client and
to which she was entitled upon her request.
The Board of Commissioners further found the appellant's handling of one matter complained of by Charles T.
Hales to have violated the Code of Professional Responsibility
and Canons of Judicial Ethics of the American Bar Association
in the following particulars:

DR2-110 (B) (3) in failing to

withdraw from the case after his physical condition had made
it unreasonably difficult for him to carry out his professional
responsibilities; DR2-110 (B) (4) for refusing to withdraw from
the case after he had been discharged by the client; DR6-101
(3) for neglecting a legal matter entrusted to him; DR7-101 (A)
(2) for failure to fulfill his contract of employment; and
DR9-102 (B) (3) (4) for failing to account for funds advanced
by the client and failure to deliver said funds upon demand
of the client.
Based upon the above findings, the Board of Commissioners of the Utah State Bar recommended to this Honorable
Court that Serge B, Gudmundsen be suspended from the practice
of law until he can satisfy the Board of Commissioners of the
Utah State Bar and this Court that he is competent to practice
law in the State of Utah.
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RULING SOUGHT BY RESPONDENT ON APPEAL
Respondent requests affirmance of the Findings of
Fact and imposition of the Recommendations of the Board of Commissioners of the Utah State Bar upon the appellant, Serge B.
Gudmundsen.
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS
The action of the Board of Commissioners of the Utah
State Bar was initiated in response to complaints filed with
the Bar by two clients of the appellant, Serge B. Gudmundsen
(TR 8-11).

The fact pattern in each complaint is highly similar

Mrs. Verus N. Thornley and her minor son were charged
with disturbing the peace in a complaint filed by her neighbor
following a verbal altercation between the two.

Mrs. Thornley

contacted Mr. Gudmundsen to defend herself and her son in the
criminal matters and to bring a civil suit against the neighbor
for damages arising from a long history of such hostile incidents (TR 88). In an oral agreement, Mr. Gudmundsen agreed to
represent the Thornleys in all three matters for $200.00 for
each criminal case, and $1,100.00 for the civil suit (TR 89).
I
It was Mrs. Thornley's understanding that these fees would
fully cover each action and the entire fqe of $1,500.00 was
paid to Mr. Gudmundsen shortly thereafter1 (TR 90).

The evi-

dence submitted at the Bar hearing and the Findings of Facts
of the Bar Commissioners show that Mr. Gudmundsen fully defended
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Mrs, Thornley in the criminal proceeding against herself
(TR 91-93, Finding of Fact No, 2 ) , did nothing to represent
Mrs. Thornleyfs minor son (TR 93-94, Findings of Fact No. 3 ) ,
and proceeded slowly and erratically on the civil suit despite
his client's frequent demands for more diligent progress until
his health forced him to discontinue his practice in the summer of 1974, nearly two years after the agreement between he
and Mrs. Thornley had first been reached (TR 94-109).

During

that time, the only known action taken by Mr. Gudmundsen was
to file a complaint (TR 98), file a Notice of Readiness for
Trial (See State Bar Exhibit 14), and take the defendant
neighbor's deposition and accompany Mrs. Thornley to her
deposition (TR 103)•
Immediately following the conclusion of the criminal
trial, Mrs. Thornley expressed reservations about continuing
the civil suit, but was strongly encouraged by Mr. Gudmundsen
that a suit alleging malicious prosecution would have a good
chance for success (TR 95-96).

At a subsequent meeting, Mrs.

Thornley again expressed her reservations about continuing
the suit, but consented to proceeding when told that only a
partial refund of her fee was possible due to time and effort
expended in preparation (TR 99-100).

At a later date, after

numerous delays, Mrs. Thornley informed Mr. Gudmundsen by
letter that he was to withdraw as attorney for plaintiff, and
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refund all unearned fees immediately with J an accounting (State
Bar Exhibit No. 15). Mrs. Thornley also demanded refund advanced for defense of her minor son since the charge had been
dismissed on the Juvenile Court's own motion and without any
apparent effort by Mr. Gudmundsen (State Bar Exhibit No. 15).
Following receipt of this letter, the appellant herein called
Mrs. Thornley and again convinced her to continue with himself as counsel while promising greater diligence (TR 102-103).
Prior to this incident, which occurred more than thirteen
months after their initial meeting, only the complaint had
been filed.

Thereafter, the Notice of Readiness was filed

and depositions were taken.

Several months later, Mr. Gud-

mundsen advised Mrs. Thornley not to plan a vacation for the
upcoming summer since trial was imminent (TR 104).

By the

middle of that summer, appellant had suspended his practice
without notice to his client.

The next information Mrs.

Thornley received indicated Mr. Vlahos had entered the case
as substitute counsel and was entering appearances on her
behalf at various hearings without her knowledge, including
one on a Motion for Summary Judgment initiated by the defendant (TR 105). Beyond the last mentioned meeting, Mrs. Thornley
was unable to locate or communicate with Mr. Gudmundsen
(TR 104-109).
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The second complaint was made by Mr, Charles T.
Hales who retained Mr, Gudmundsen after being arrested and
charged along with his wife with driving under the influence
and public intoxication.

At their first meeting, appellant

suggested to Mr, Hales that he also file a false arrest suit
against the arresting officers for the brutal treatment he
received during his custody in connection with these charges.
Mr, Hales accepted this advice (TR 22). Mr, Gudmundsen then
agreed to represent the Hales on all three matters for $200.00
for each criminal charge and $1,800.00 for Mr. Hales1 false
arrest and battery suit (TR 19-21),

Appellant did fully de-

fend both Mr. and Mrs. Hales in criminal actions attaining
a not guilty verdict for Mr, Hales, and eventual dismissal of
the charges against Mrs. Hales (TR 24-25).

As in Mrs. Thornleyfs

case, these events occurred over a period of approximately
twenty-two (22) months.

During that time, appellant did not

file the complaint in the civil suit or perform any work known
to Mr. Hales, despite the fact that Mr. Hales was acquitted of
the charges against him within a couple of weeks of their first
meeting.

During this twenty-two (22) month period Mr, Hales

contacted Mr. Gudmundsen numerous times -- each time receiving
assurances that the complaint would be prepared for his signature with days.

Like Mrs. Thornley, Mr, Hales also terminated

Mr, Gudmundsen demanding an accounting and refund of all unearned fees (State Bar Exhibit No. 5), only to be talked out
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of that decision on appellant's promises to proceed with proper diligence in the future (TR 26-27, defendant's exhibit No. 3).
Eventually, Mr. Hales was forced to retaiii another attorney and
obtain a judgment in state district court (before he could get
a refund on any of the fee he advanced (State Bar Exhibit No. 1).
During the interim, appellant made no accounting or refund of
Mr* Hales1 moneys despite numerous letters of demand and visits
to appellant's office by Mr. Hales' seconcji attorney, Mr. Farr
(TR 28-29 State Bar Exhibits 4, 6-10).
ARGUMENT
POINT I
APPELLANT WAS AFFORDED A FAIR
AND ADEQUATE HEARING
Respondent agrees with appellant's contention that
due process of law requires a fair and adequate hearing in connection with matters such as that presented here, but denies
that the hearing in this case precluded the presentation of a
valid defense.

The Hearing Commissioner ipully acknowledged

Mr. Gudmundsen's inability to attend for reasons of bad health
(TR 5-7). At the outset of the hearing, Commissioner Lee asked
counsel for Mr. Gudmundsen if he had any objection to the proceeding on the grounds that appellant's rights would be prejudiced by his absence.

Counsel responded that Mr. Gudmundsen

had authorized his counsel to represent him at the proceeding

-7-

and agreed to the hearing going forward at that time (TR 5) .
Appellant's counsel further indicated that no firm date could
be predicted when appellant would be sufficiently recovered
to attend the hearing.

In the course of his reply, counsel

for Mr. Gudmundsen seemed most concerned with the record reflecting that Mr. Gudmundsenfs absence was due to his continuing health problems, and at no point did he make an explicit
or strenuous objection to the proceeding going forward in Mr.
Gudmundsen1s absence (TR 5-6). Following counsel's response,
the Hearing Commissioner noted the numerous continuances already extended to appellant and concluded that a diligent handling of these complaints coupled with the protection afforded
Mr. Gudmundsen's rights by the presence of his counsel required that the hearing commence.

This decision by the

Hearing Examiner was neither arbitrary, unfair, nor prejudicial to the rights of the appellant herein.
At Page 9 of his brief, appellant states:

"An exami-

nation of the transcript from the court will evidence that the
counsel for the appellant was indeed unable to make an adequate
defense of his client . . . for appellant was repeatedly denied
opportunities to introduce matters in contradiction and mitigation of testimony of the adverse witnesses by reason of the
absence of the appellant."

It is interesting to note that this

purely conclusory statement is not supported by any citation
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to any portion of the record revealing an^ refusal to admit
any evidence or information contradicting that given by the
witnesses and complainants at this hearing.

In fact, the

transcript discloses that counsel for the appellant made no
proffer of or reference to any type of evidence or information
which could contradict or qualify or in a^ty way change the
meaning of any of the evidence submitted by the complainants
and witnesses in this hearing.

Appellant's brief to this

Honorable Court is likewise void of any reference to or indication of the existence of any evidence or information which
would mitigate or disprove the charges brought against the
appellant in this proceeding, or any other explanation of the
meaning of this allegation.
Moreover, the medical evidence submitted to the Hearing Examiner to establish appellant's inability to attend discussed only appellant's inability to travel due to the delicacy of the surgery performed on his eyes.

Since appellant,

Serge B. Gudmundsen, was personally responding to interrogatories in the law suit initiated against him by Mr. Hales
just shortly before the date of this hearing, it must be concluded that Mr. Gudmundsen was capable of comprehending questions and framing answers relating to these matters.

Appellant,

therefore, could have prepared affidavits for this hearing or
could have been deposed by his own counsel for purposes of
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preparing an admissible evidentuary record on his own behalf.
Similarly, appellant was not prohibited from introducing his
files on these cases to demonstrate the extent of his diligence
and work product.

Appellant was, therefore, not denied the op-

portunity to present a valid defense merely because he was not
present and the hearing was conducted under the Rules of Evidence in effect in the District Courts of this State.
The effect of this argument by the appellant is to
boot-strap a defense where none exists.

That is, appellant

declined to offer a defense when he had the opportunity to do
so, and now he submits to this Honorable Court that the absence
of that defense is denial of due process.

The fact is, appel-

lant was afforded every reasonable opportunity to rebut the
information alleged in the complaints filed by Mrs. Thornley
and Mr. Hales, and so received a fair and adequate hearing.
POINT II
THE PROCEDURE CHALLENGED HEREIN
WAS PROPERLY CONDUCTED AND THE
FINDINGS OF FACT AND RECOMMENDATIONS
OF THE BOARD OF COMMISSIONERS OF
THE UTAH STATE BAR WERE NOT DRAWN
ARBITRARILY FOLLOWING THAT PROCEEDING.
Respondent fully agrees with appellant's contention
that it is the power and duty of this Honorable Court to review
the record in this matter to insure that the hearing was properly conducted and that the Findings of Fact and Recommendations published by the Board of Commissioners of the Utah State
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Bar were not arbitrarily drawn from the evidence produced at
that hearing*

Indeed, this review could not proceed other-

wise since it is the sole and exclusive province of this Court
to impose the penalties recommended by the Board of Commissioners,
In respect to these duties and responsibilities, respondent denies that this Court has not been presented with
any significant evidence because of arbitrary or improper exclusion at the hearing challenged herein.

Again, appellant

had every reasonable opportunity to present alternative forms
of direct testimony such as affidavits, depositions, or documents from his case files to rebut the allegations contained
in the complaints made against him to the State Bar.

This is

nothing more than the same boot-strap argument made before,
that because appellant declined to put on a defense the findings
and recommendations of the Board of Commissioners are arbitrary
for being one-sided.

In fact, there is substantial evidence

in the record for every finding reached by the Board of Commissioners.

Against that evidence, the hearing record is void

of any proffer or indication of any evidence or information
which would contradict, mitigate, or otherwise qualify the
evidence supporting the findings published by the Board of
Commissioners.

Similarly, appellant's brief fails to cite

this Court to one instance where any evidence of substantial
importance was excluded by the Hearing Examiner, or any mention or protest of appellant's counsel that such evidence

-11-

existed and could not be presented unless the hearing was postponed until the appellant could appear personally.

As such,

apart from appellant's conclusory statements there is no information before this Court which would indicate that it does not
have before it all the evidence pertinent to this matter.
Appellant argues in his brief that he was denied due
process by being prevented from introducing evidence that the
demands of the complainants were unreasonable when the work product of the appellant was compared to the total fees received.
First, the evidence presented was that the fees for each individual action were agreed to before money was paid by either
of the complainants, and the appellant himself at Page 12 of
his brief cites Utah Code Annotated 78-51-41 for the proposition that the rate of compensation for legal services is a matter wholly between the attorney and his client.

That evidence

would need to be rebutted before this argument would have been
material.

No such rebuttal evidence was offered.
Second, such evidence is immaterial to the charges

made against Mr. Gudmundsen regardless of the fee agreements.
This is a disbarment action, not a suit for recovery of unearned fees.

Appellant has been charged with failure to ac-

count for fees paid when so requested by his clients, failure
to withdraw when requested, failure to withdraw after he became physically incapable of continuing his work, substitution
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of counsel without the consent of his client, neglect of
a legal matter entrusted to him, failure to carry out his
contract of employment, and prejudice of his client's case
by his actions.

Whether in the opinion of anyone else he

earned more than the originally stipulated fees in his criminal defanse of any of these individuals has no bearing on
any of the above charges.

For the same reasons, appellant's

inclusions of an affidavit referring to the settlements of
each claim, one in satisfaction of the judgment resulting
from Mr. Hales1 law suit, and the other from an out of court
settlement with Mrs. Thornley, has no bearing upon the charges
presented here whatsoever.

In the final analysis, this whole

line of argument presents a complete confusion between disbarment charges and a suit for return of unearned fees when
the two are separate and distinct proceedings relying on different charges, considerations, and defenses.

To raise in one

proceeding a defense unique to the other, as appellant does
here, is simply not to respond to the charge at issue. Appellant made the same objection in respect to Mr. Hales' complaint
at the Bar Hearing and it was properly denied by the Hearing
Examiner for the same reasons presented ncjw.
Thirdly, as has been discussed previously, appellant
had every reasonable opportunity to submit all proper and material evidence he could otherwise offer if present personally
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through deposition or affidavit or submission of his case file
into evidence.

The fact is, if he had any material evidence to

present on his behalf he declined to do so, and so has no standing to complain of that fact now*
CONCLUSION
The record in this matter clearly discloses that
appellant herein was afforded a fair and adequate hearing in
this disciplinary proceeding.

The Findings of Fact and recom-

mendations of the Board of Commissioners of the Utah State Bar
presented to this Honorable Court are all based on substantial
and uncontroverted evidence presented by the complaining parties
and their witnesses.

At this hearing the appellant had the op-

portunity but declined to present positive evidence in rebuttal
of that offered by the prosecutor for the State Bar.

The errors

alleged by the appellant on this appeal are inconsistent with
the record or immaterial to the complaints lodged by the complainants herein.

This hearing procedure was, therefore, pro-

per and there is no evidence that the record presented to this
Court does not contain all of the material evidence and information necessary for this Court to fully review this matter and
take final action.

The ultimate settlement of the monetary

aspects of Mrs. ThornleyTs and Mr. Hales1 complaints cannot
alter the important facts which establish that the manner in
which Mr. Gudmundsen handled their cases constituted a breach
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of the Code of Professional Responsibility and Cannons of
Judicial Ethics in several particulars for which reason this
Court should suspend Serge B. Gudmundsen'p authority to practice law until he can demonstrate to this Court that he is
able to resume practice in a competent and responsible manner.
Respectfully submitted,

1

f*t"\
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P. KEITH NELSON
Attorney for Respondent
716 Newhouse Office Building
Salt Lake City, Utah
84111
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